



EVENT TREE ANALYSIS

1. Introduction
2. ETA in 6 steps
3. Case study : Separator Safety System
4. Comparison with RBD and FTA





FTA = Deductive approach

- Characterization of an critical event by the identification of all its causes

ETA = Inductive approach


- Find all outcomes from an initiating event
- Analyze the accidental progression according to the safety functions

An event tree is a logic tree diagram that starts from a basic initiating event and provides a systematic coverage of the time sequence of event propagation to its potential outcomes or consequences

- Each event in the tree (success or failure of the safety function) is conditional on the occurrence of the previous event



1 Identification of a relevant initiating (accidental) event (IE)



1 Identification of a relevant initiating (accidental) event (IE)

2 Safety Functions

Characterization of the whole system's defense against the occurrence of the IE

Identification of all the safety functions (barriers, safety systems, procedures, operator actions, ...)

Master ISMP - Castanier

Classification (AIChE 1985) :

- Automatic safety systems that respond to the IE (automatic shutdown system)
- Alarms (fire alarm systems)
- Operator procedures following an alarm
- Barriers or containment methods intended to limit the effects of IE

Determination of the sequence of activation of each safety functions




1 Identification of a relevant initiating (accidental) event (IE)

2 Safety Functions


3 Event tree construction

Chronological development of the event chains



Application of the propagation of the accidental situation for a dust explosion

Initiating Event	Start of fire	Springler system does not function	Fire alarm is not activated	Outcomes
------------------	---------------	------------------------------------	-----------------------------	----------





1 Identification of a relevant initiating (accidental) event (IE)


2 Safety Functions

3 Event tree construction

4 Description of the resulting event sequences

Qualitative classification of the scenarios according to their criticality

Master ISMP - Castanier



Outcome Descr.	Frequency	Loss of life					Material damage				Environmental damage					
		0	1-2	3-5	6-20	>20	N	L	M	H	N	L	M	H		





1 Identification of a relevant initiating (accidental) event (IE)

2 Safety Functions

3 Event tree construction

4 Description of the resulting event sequences

5 Quantitative assessment

Master ISMP - Castanier

Initiating Event	Start of fire	Springler system does not function	Fire alarm is not activated	Outcomes	Frequency (per year)
Explosion $\lambda=10^{-2}$ per year	True 0.80	True 0.01	True 0.001	Uncontrolled fire with no alarm	8.0 e-8
			False 0.999	Uncontrolled fire with alarm	7.9 e-6
		False 0.99	True 0.001	Controlled fire with no alarm	8.0 e-5
			False 0.999	Controlled fire with alarm	7.9 e-3
	False 0.20			No fire	2.0 e-3





1 Identification of a relevant initiating (accidental) event (IE)

2 Safety Functions

3 Event tree construction

4 Description of the resulting event sequences

5 Quantitative assessment

6 Compilation and presentation of the results from the analysis

- Discussion of the different assumptions
- Outline the critical weakness of the system
- Proposition of corrective actions (possibility to evaluate the impact of the introduction of a new protective system against the IE)

Positive

- Visualize event chains following an accidental event
- Visualize barriers and sequence of activation
- Good basis for evaluating the need for new / improved procedures and safety functions

Negative


- No standard for the graphical representation of the event tree
- Only one initiating event can be studied in each analysis
- Easy to overlook subtle system dependencies
- Not well suited for handling common cause failures in the quantitative analyses
- The event tree does not show acts of omission

Analyse the reliability of the first stage separator system with

- Fault Tree approach
- Event Tree approach
- Design the Reliability Block Diagram of the system




Master ISMP - Castanier



Process shutdown system (PSD)




Master ISMP - Castanier



Process shutdown system (PSD)



Master ISMP - Castanier



Process shutdown system (PSD)




Piper Alpha accident in 1986 – 167 fatalities




Relevant top event: « *Critical overpressure in the first stage operator* »

- critical situation occurs during normal production
- the fluid level in the separator is normal



Relevant top event: « Critical overpressure in the first stage operator »

- critical situation occurs during normal production
- the fluid level in the separator is normal



Note

- the lowest level of resolution = failure mode of a technical item
- might be of interest to break down some of the rather complex items into subitems (e.g. valves)
- failure of the pressure switches should be split in
 - individual failures (independent)
 - common cause failures (simultaneously) eg: miscalibration



Plot the catastrophic scenario according time





Construct the event tree





Construct the associated reliability block diagram

